Find what's hiding in your agent stack
209 detection rules. 16 threat categories. Prompt injection, credential harvesting, tool poisoning, supply chain attacks — scanned in seconds, reported in plain English.
Research published in 2025–2026 shows what’s already happening to agent users:
| Stat | Source |
|---|---|
| 72.8% MCP tool poisoning attack success rate | MCPTox Research |
| 82% of MCP servers have path traversal vulnerabilities | Endor Labs |
| 7.1% of agent marketplace skills are actively stealing credentials | Firmis Research |
| 1.2M malicious packages discovered in the wild | Sonatype 2026 |
| CVSS 10/10 zero-click RCE in Claude Desktop Extensions | LayerX Security |
You are not the target. Your credentials are. And they’re sitting one misconfigured MCP server away from leaving your machine.
Find what's hiding in your agent stack
209 detection rules. 16 threat categories. Prompt injection, credential harvesting, tool poisoning, supply chain attacks — scanned in seconds, reported in plain English.
Audit every MCP server you've installed
72.8% of poisoning attacks succeed against popular LLMs. Firmis checks your MCP configs for hidden instructions, malicious tool definitions, and unauthorized network calls before they run.
Know exactly what's in your AI stack
CycloneDX 1.7 Agent Bill of Materials — every component, dependency, model, and tool definition catalogued. Know what you have before you ship it.
Block threats in CI before they reach prod
One command: discover → BOM → scan → report. SARIF output for GitHub Security tab. Exit non-zero on high or critical findings. Done.
| Platform | What gets scanned | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Skills | CLAUDE.md, tool definitions, permission scopes | GA |
| MCP Servers | Server configs, tool handlers, transport layer | GA |
| Cursor Rules | .cursorrules, workspace settings, extensions | GA |
| Codex Plugins | Plugin manifests, tool definitions | Beta |
| CrewAI Agents | Agent configs, tool definitions, task chains | Beta |
| AutoGPT Plugins | Plugin manifests, command handlers | Experimental |
| OpenClaw Skills | Skill definitions, skill handlers | Experimental |
| Nanobot Plugins | Plugin configs, tool handlers | Experimental |
npx firmis scan . │ ▼┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐│ Discovery │───▶│ Rule Engine │───▶│ Reporter ││ │ │ │ │ ││ Auto-detect │ │ 209 YAML │ │ Terminal ││ 8 platforms │ │ rules across │ │ JSON / SARIF ││ components │ │ 16 threat │ │ HTML report ││ dependencies │ │ categories │ │ │└─────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └─────────────┘No account. No telemetry. Nothing leaves your machine.
How the detection engine works →
Every finding comes with a severity rating, a plain English explanation of what it means, and what to do about it.
| Category | What it catches | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Tool Poisoning | Hidden instructions in tool descriptions that hijack your agent | Critical |
| Data Exfiltration | Skills sending your local files to external servers | Critical–High |
| Credential Harvesting | Tools reading AWS, GCP, Azure, or SSH credentials | Critical–High |
| Prompt Injection | Instructions that override your agent’s behavior | Critical–High |
| Secret Detection | Hardcoded API keys, tokens, and passwords | Critical–Medium |
| Supply Chain | Dependencies with known vulnerabilities (OSV database) | High–Medium |
| Malware Signatures | Known malicious code patterns | Critical |
| Known Malicious | Packages flagged across threat intelligence databases | Critical |
| Network Abuse | Unauthorized DNS or HTTP calls | High–Medium |
| File System Abuse | Unauthorized reads or writes to your filesystem | High–Medium |
| Permission Overgrant | Tool scopes wider than they need to be | High–Medium |
| Agent Memory Poisoning | Instructions corrupting your agent’s context window | High |
| Malware Distribution | Tools spreading payloads to other systems | Critical–High |
| Privilege Escalation | Gaining access your agent was never granted | High |
| Insecure Configuration | Weak or missing security settings | Medium–Low |
| Access Control | Missing authentication or authorization checks | High–Medium |
View all 209 detection rules →
Wait — my AI tools can actually steal my stuff?
Yes. Every agent you install — Cursor, Claude, MCP servers, OpenClaw skills — gets access to your files, API keys, and credentials. Most people never check what these tools actually do behind the scenes. Our research found that 7.1% of agent marketplace skills are actively stealing credentials or sending data to external servers. One command will tell you if yours are clean.
What exactly does Firmis check for?
209 rules across 16 threat categories: prompt injection, credential harvesting, data exfiltration, tool poisoning, supply chain attacks, hardcoded secrets, malware signatures, and more. Every finding is explained in plain English — not cryptic error codes. “This skill is reading your AWS credentials and sending them to an unknown server” is the kind of message you get.
Is my code uploaded anywhere?
No. Firmis is fully offline. It reads your config files and source code locally — nothing leaves your machine. No telemetry, no analytics, no account required. Ever.
I’m not a security expert. Can I still use this?
That’s exactly who we built it for. You don’t need to understand regex patterns or YARA rules. You run npx firmis scan . and you get a report that says what’s wrong and what to do about it. Plain English. Every time.
How is this different from Snyk or Semgrep?
Snyk and Semgrep are built for traditional application code. They don’t know what an MCP server is, what tool poisoning looks like, or how to read a CLAUDE.md file for hidden instructions. Firmis is purpose-built for the AI agent threat surface: 8 platforms, 209 rules written specifically for how agents get compromised.
Is it really free?
Completely free. npx firmis scan . — no account, no credit card, no usage limits. You get a security grade (A through F) and a full list of findings in plain English.